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Muddy Waters: Congressional Consent and
the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Compact
by SONYA F. PALAY*
After nearly a century of negotiations among the Great Lakes states,
tribes, and provinces, a promising new agreement was recently ratified by
the parties and recognized by Congress, this is the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact' ("GLC"). Interstate
compacts, like the GLC, may serve as a particularly useful tool for solving
regional environmental problems which the federal government lacks the
interest to resolve.2  However, due to constitutional strictures, interstate
compacts are not binding unless Congress grants consent to the compact.
This Note will focus on the GLC as a means to examine the current state of
the law surrounding the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution.3
Part I briefly describes the necessary background information to understand
the GLC and the 2000 amendment to the Water Resources Development
Act4 ("2000 WRDA"). Part II introduces the Compact Clause. 5 Part III
will examine why it is an agreement that is subject to the consent
requirement of the Compact Clause. Part IV will discuss whether Congress
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2004,
Medieval and Early Modem Studies, University of Michigan. She would like to thank
Professors Noah Hall and John Leshy for their comments; Nadim Hegazi and the staff of
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for an outstanding year; and especially Andrew Ziaja, for
his love, encouragement and ciphers.
1. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342,
122 Stat. 3740 (2008) [hereinafter GLC].
2. See, e.g., id.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. 3.
4. Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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explicitly or implicitly granted prior consent to the compact, when it passed
the 2000 WRDA or the Weeks Act of 1911.6
I. Introduction to the 2000 WRDA and the GLC
A. The Unique Geography and History of the Great Lakes Region
It is helpful to begin with a brief history of Great Lakes management
to best understand both the GLC and whether the 2000 WRDA constitutes
"consent of Congress," 7 thereby rendering the GLC enforceable.8
Ironically, previous management efforts have been compromised by
the same political and ecological peculiarities of the Great Lakes drainage
basin ("the Basin") that create the imperative to manage the lakes. These
aspects can be roughly grouped into three categories. 9
The first peculiarity is the sheer volume of water the lakes contain in
relation to local demand.' 0 The Great Lakes-Superior, Michigan, Huron,
Erie, Ontario-and the St. Lawrence River form the world's largest surface
fresh water resource, l and constitute nearly twenty percent of the surface
fresh water of the world, and ninety percent of the surface fresh water of
the United States.l
2
Second, this massive amount of water is subject to the laws of
multiple governments-Canada, the United States, as well as Tribes, First
Nations and local governments. 13  The Basin includes the states of
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and New York as well as by the Canadian Provinces of Ontario and
Quebec.' 4 Roughly forty million people rely on the Basin for their drinking
water. 15
6. Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
8. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,438 (1981).
9. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management
in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405,414-16 (2006).
10. Id. at 414-15.
11. See Michael J. Donahue et al., Great Lakes Diversion and Consumptive Use: The Issue
in Perspective, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 19, 20 (1986).
12. Mark J. Dinsmore, Like a Mirage in the Desert: Great Lakes Water Quantity
Preservation Efforts and Their Punitive Effects, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 449 (1993).
13. See Hall, supra note 9, at 415.
14. See CHRISTINE MANNINEN & ROGER GAUTHIER, LIVING WITH THE LAKES 6 (Roger
Gauthier & Michael J. Donahue eds., 2000) (1999).
15. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 6 (2000), available at
http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/finalreport.html. Moreover, the Great Lakes have been
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Finally, on the whole, Great Lakes citizens feel overwhelming pride
for the lakes. 16 This pride shows in the tendency of these citizens to
zealously guard the water from out-of-Basin diversions.17 Yet, generally,
when the state legislatures address the lakes, they pass what amounts to
"bold proclamations about the Great Lakes" rather than creating legal
obligations for Great Lakes citizens and businesses.
18
B. Previous Great Lakes Management Efforts
1. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
The first major attempt to spell out the obligations of Canada and the
United States to manage and share the water of the Great Lakes was the
bilateral Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.19 The treaty created the
International Joint Commission ("IJC") to oversee the management of the
lakes and handle trans-boundary disputes. 20  The IJC is comprised of six
members-three from each country.
21
Despite the cooperative nature of the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909,22 it suffers significant deficiencies preventing it from being an
effective tool to protect and manage Great Lakes water. The primary
problem is that the power of the IJC is limited; it only has binding arbitral
the foundation of the region's economy. Id. And the lakes are critical to the manufacturing
industry of the region. See Great Lakes Regional Collaboration s Straiegy to . iore .  d
Protect the Great Lakes: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Environment & Public Work: 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Andy Buchsbaum, director, National Wildlife Federation's Great
Lakes Office and Co-Chair Healing Our Waters® Great Lakes Coalition), available at
http://epw.senate.gov/109th/BuchsbaumTestimony.pdf. [hereinafter Buchsbaum testimony].
Great Lakes Regional Collaboration's Strategy to Restore and Protect the Great Lakes: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Environment & Public Work: 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of George
Kuper, President, Council of Great Lakes Industries, Great Lakes Regional Collaboration's
Strategy to Restore and Protect the Great Lakes), available at http://epw.senate.gov/
hearing statements.cfnid=252774.
16. Buchsbaum testimony, supra note 15 (quoting Tom Kiernan, President of the National
Parks Conservation Association: "The Great Lakes are national icons, a beautiful natural treasure
you can see even from space. Like the majestic Grand Canyon and Everglades, these inland
oceans help define the soul of a region and the landscape of a nation.").
17. See Bob Downing, National Treasure: As More Regions Suffer Droughts, the Great
Lakes Are Becoming a Highly Sought Source for Water, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 23, 2007.
18. Hall, supra note 9, at 415.
19. Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-U.K., 36 Stat. 2448 (U.K. entered treaty on
behalf of Canada) [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty]; Daniel K. Dewitt, Note, Great Words
Needed for the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 69 IND.
L.J. 299, 309 (1993).
20. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 19, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451.
21. Id.
22. Mark L. Glode & Beverly Nelson Glode, Transboundary Pollution: Acid Rain and
United States-Canadian Relations, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 at 14-15, (1993).
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power in a dispute if both countries consent to its jurisdiction for that
dispute.23 Furthermore, the IJC can only make recommendations regarding
pollution control to the United States and Canada.24 Moreover the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 only deals with four of the lakes; Lake
Michigan, the second largest of the five lakes by volume, is not covered by
the treaty, because it is wholly within the borders of the United States.
25
2. The Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1968
Although it was the first interstate compact regarding Great Lakes
management to be approved by Congress, the Great Lakes Basin Compact
of 196826 did very little to contribute to the regulation of the lakes.
27
Similar to the Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, the Great Lakes Basin
Compact of 1968 created a body to conduct research and make
recommendations regarding water management; this was the Great Lakes
Commission ("Commission"). 28 The Commission could only act in a
purely advisory role-according to the compact, "No action of the
Commission shall have the force of law in, or be binding upon, any party
state. 29
Because of this, the Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1968 has garnered
its fair share of criticism. Professor Dellapena has commented that the
Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1968 is typical of the "we'll keep in touch
approach" of eastern interstate water compacts. 30 This approach "failed to
accomplish much towards protecting the biological, chemical, and physical
integrity of the rivers and lakes addressed in the particular compacts.'
23. Boundary Water Treaty, supra note 19, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2453.
24. Id. at 2450; see also Gregory Wetstone & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary Air
Pollution: The Search for an International Response, 8 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 89, 134 (1984)
(discussing IJC authority). However, this does not mean that the IJC has entirely neglected issues
of pollution control. See Dewitt, supra note 19, at 320-23 (evaluating the IJC's actions regarding
pollution management).
25. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 19, at 2448; see also Hall, supra note 9, at 416-19.
26. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968) [hereinafter 1968
Great Lakes Basin Compact].
27. Hall, supra note 9, at 423-24.
28. 1968 Great Lakes Basin Compact, supra note 26, art. VI(N) (providing that "no action
of the commission shall have the force of law in, or be binding upon, any party state [or
province]"); see also Christine A. Klein, The Law of the Lakes: From Protectionism to
Sustainability, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1259, 1268-69 (2006).
29. 1968 Great Lakes Basin Compact, supra note 26, art VI(N).
30. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and
the Struggle Over the "Hooch ", 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 838-39 (2005); see also Hall, supra note
9, at 423; Klein, supra note 28, at 1268-69.
31. Dellapenna, supra note 30, at 839.
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3. 1980s Diversions
The mid 1980s saw several proposals to divert Great Lakes water for
uses in other states such as recharging the Ogallala Aquifer and
"[improving] navigation on the Mississippi River. 3 2 Public outrage over
these proposed diversions led to the enactment of an interstate agreement,
the Great Lakes Charter in 1985, and national legislation, the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986.
i. The Great Lakes Charter of 1985
The Great Lakes Charter of 198533 ("Charter") was a good faith
agreement between the eight Great Lakes states and the provinces of
Ontario and Quebec.34 Because the Charter is an agreement between states
and lacks the consent of Congress, it also lacks the force of law. 35 The
Charter nonetheless represents a "successful shift in focus" by conceiving
of the lakes as a single hydrological system, including Lake Michigan.
36
The Charter commits its members to regulate new and increased
consumptive uses of water as well as diversions more than two million
gallons per day, provides for a prior notice and consultation procedure for
new and/or increased uses and diversions greater than five million gallons
per day. It also commits its members to gather and report data on new and
increased withdrawals greater than one hundred thousand gallons per day.37
But because the Charter is non-binding, the above commitments have
been largely ignored or neglected.38 Professor Hall has posited that had the
32. Chris A. Shafer, Great Lakes Diversions Revisited: Legal Constraints and Opportunities
for State Regulation, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 461, 463 (2000); see also James M. Olson,
Environmental Law: Great Lakes Water: Michigan Needs a Comprehensive Water Diversion and
Use Law to Address the Looming World Water Crisis, Threatened Privatization and Low Water
Levels, 80 MICH. B. J. 32, at 33-34 (2001).
33. The Great Lakes Charter, Feb. 11, 1985, reprinted in Great Lakes Governors' Task
Force, Council of Great Lakes Governors, Final Report and Recommendation on Water Diversion
and Great Lakes Institutions (1985), http://www.cglg.org/pub/charter/index.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2008).
34. Hall, supra note 9, at 424.
35. Id. at 426; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also Dellapena, supra note 30, at
854 (stating that "the lack of congressional consent makes the charter utterly unenforceable on its
own").
36. It recognized that "water-withdrawal decisions and actions had to consider this
interconnectivity." Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources With Interstate Compacts: A
Perspective From the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173, (2007); see also Council of Great
Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Charter of 1985, Feb. 11, 1985.
37. Hall, supra note 9, at 424.
38. See Stephen Frerichs & K. William Easter, Regulation of Interbasin Transfers and
Consumptive Uses from the Great Lakes, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 561, 566-68 (1990); see also
Hall, supra note 9, at 424-25.
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Charter used the constitutional compact process and become binding law,
"it would have been an important first step toward comprehensive water
management of the Great Lakes., 39 As it stands though, the Charter has
done little to achieve meaningful management of the Great Lakes.
ii. 1986 Water Resources Development Act
Congress enacted section 1109 of the Water Resources Development
Act (hereinafter "1986 WRDA") in 1986.40 Like the Charter, the 1986
WRDA was primarily concerned with preventing out-of-basin water
diversions. The legislation provides:
No water shall be diverted or exported from any portion of the Great
Lakes within the United States, or tributary within the United States
of any of the Great Lakes for use outside the Great Lakes basin
unless such diversions or export is approved by the Governor of each
of the Great Lake [sic] States.
Unfortunately, the 1986 WRDA provides no standards for the
governors to use to determine which diversions should be approved.42 This
has the potential to lead to approvals based more on interstate politics than
what is ecologically beneficial or sustainable for the Great Lakes. This is
also problematic because all of the Great Lakes states have most of their
territory outside of the Basin, except for Michigan. This means that
Michigan can veto all diversions, without consequence to itself, an effect
which does not encourage productive negotiations nor meaningful policy
development between signing states.43
Fourteen years after its enactment, Congress amended the WRDA to
include the following declared Congressional purpose and policy:
to take immediate action to protect the limited quantity of water
available from the Great Lakes system for use by the Great Lakes
States ... to encourage the Great Lakes States, in consultation with
the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, to develop and implement a
mechanism that provides a common conservation standard
embodying the principles of water conservation and resource
39. Hall, supra note 9, at 426.
40. Water Resources Development Act, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 1109, 100 Stat. 4082, 4230
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000)).
41. Id.
42. Hall, supra note 9, at 430-31.
43. Id.
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improvement for making decisions concerning the withdrawal and
use of water from the Great Lakes Basin.44
Part IV of this Note will discuss the significance of this provision at
length.
4. Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001
The Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001 ("Annex 2001") is the latest in a
long series of handshake agreements between the Great Lakes states, tribes,
and provinces.45 Like the Charter,46 Annex 2001 was signed by the eight
Great Lakes governors, and the premiers of Ontario and Quebec.47 It acts
as "a mechanism to bridge the gap between the charter [sic] and the
WRDA. It buil[t] on the 1985 Charter and focus[ed] on a standard for
reviewing all water withdrawals, not only diversions. 48  Annex 2001
builds on prior agreements and commits its signatories to:
Further implementing the principles of the [Great Lakes] Charter by
developing an enhanced water management system that is simple,
durable, efficient, retains and respects authority within the [Great
Lakes] Basin, and, most importantly, protects, conserves, restores,
and improves the Waters and Water-Dependent Natural Resources of
the Great Lakes Basin .... In order to adequately protect the water
resources of the Great Lakes and the Great Lakes ecosystem, the
Governors and Premiers commit to develop and implement a new
common, resource-based conservation standard and apply it to new
water withdrawal proposals from the Waters of the Great Lakes
Basin. The standard will also address proposed increases to existing
water withdrawals and existing withdrawal capacity from the Waters
of the Great Lakes Basin.49
Annex 2001 explicitly covers both surface and groundwater, and
contains a "resource-based conservation standard" to judge improvement.5 °
44. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2000).
45. Annex to the Great Lakes Charter, June 18, 2001, http://www.cglg.org/lpdfs/
Annex200l .pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Annex 2001 ].
46. The Great Lakes Charter, Feb. 11, 1985, reprinted in Great Lakes Governors' Task
Force, Council of Great Lakes Governors, Final Report and Recommendation on Water Diversion
and Great Lakes Institutions (1985), http://www.cglg.org/pub/charter/index.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2008).
47. Id.
48. See Jeffery E. Edstrom et al., An Approach for Identifying Improvements Under the
Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001, 4 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. SCL & POL'Y 335, 336 (2002).
49. Annex 2001, supra note 45.
50. Hall, supra note 9, at 431.
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Furthermore, Annex 2001 directs the Great Lakes states and the provinces
of Ontario and Quebec to enter into a binding interstate-compact that is
consistent with the goals and directives of Annex 2001.51 In this way,
Annex 2001 and the 2000 WRDA provided the foundation for the GLC.
5. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Resources Compact
In 2005, the Great Lakes governors and premiers signed the GLC and
a companion agreement-the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Sustainable Water Resources Agreement ("Agreement").52  In the
following three years, the state legislatures of the eight states ratified the
GLC and the Agreement.5 3 The GLC is distinct from other Great Lakes
agreements and laws in that it governs both surface and groundwater,54
provides Basin-wide minimum decision-making standards for both
withdrawals and consumptive uses,55 and yet leaves each of the signatory
states with the flexibility to design their own water management
programs.
56
The only requirement under the GLC applicable to the states' water
management programs is that they must, at a minimum, be consistent with
decision-making standards enumerated in the compact to oversee and
regulate new or increased withdrawals and consumptives uses.57 To
comply with the decision-making standards, a program must meet five
criteria.58 First, withdrawn water (minus an allowance for consumptive
use) must be returned to its source watershed.59 Second, withdrawals and
consumptive uses of water may not result in "significant individual or
cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity or quality of the Waters and
Water Dependent Natural Resources and the applicable Source
Watershed., 60  Third, withdrawals and consumptive uses must also
"incorporate Environmentally Sound and Economically Feasible Water
Conservation Measures. Fourth, withdrawals and consumptive uses
51. Annex 2001,supra note 45.
52. See Bielecki, supra note 36, at 184.
53. Press Release, Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River
Basin Water Resources Compact Congressional Consent Status (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.cglg.
org/projects/water/CompactConsent.asp#FederalLegislativeActivity.
54. GLC, supra note 1, § 1.2.
55. Id. § 4.10.
56. See id.
57. Id.





must comply with all applicable laws and international agreements.6 2 And
fifth, the use of the water must be "reasonable. 63
Thus, the common decision-making standard effectuates the declared
purpose of 2000 WRDA, namely by providing a common standard for
managing water withdrawals and water use that is consistent with
principles of water conservation and resource improvement.
64
That the compact would address both groundwater and surface water
is "critical to [its] eventual success ... since ground water comprises more
than fifteen percent of the total water supply in the Great Lakes basin. 65
Consumptive uses, withdrawals and diversions of water, which predate the
enactment of the GLC, however, are only governed by the compact if they
are increased or altered, so as to constitute a new use, diversion, or
withdrawal.66  Despite this limitation, for the people of the Great Lakes
region, the tools that lead to preservation and restoration of the lakes are
sources of hope-that the economy will rebound, that their environment
will be restored, and that their way of life will be preserved.67
All of these benefits are no better than gratuitous promises, however,
unless the GLC is binding law.68 In other words, its provisions must be
enforceable.6 9 In order for the GLC to be an enforceable compact, it had to




63. Id. (A determination of "reasonable" is based on the following factors: (1) does the use
minimize waste of water?; (2) are existing uses efficient?; (3) what is the balance between
economic and social development, and environmental protection of the proposed use and existing
uses?; (4) what is the quantity, quality, reliability of the water source, and the safe yield of
interconnected water sources?; (5) what is degree and duration of adverse impacts to the water
source, and other uses of water?; (6) what is potential for mitigation of those effects?; and (7)
does the proposal include plans for restoration of hydrologic conditions of the source
watershed?).
64. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2000) (stating
in relevant part, "to encourage the Great Lakes States, in consultation with the Provinces of
Ontario and Quebec, to develop and implement a mechanism that provides a common
conservation standard embodying the principles of water conservation and resource improvement
for making decisions concerning the withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes Basin.").
65. Hall, supra note 9, at 435.
66. GLC, supra note 1, § 1.2.
67. See Buchsbaum testimony, supra note 15.
68. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981).
69. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law's Lessons for the Law of the Lakes, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 796 (2007).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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II. Introduction to the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution
In order to better understand whether the GLC already had the consent
of Congress through the 2000 WRDA, or if it was necessary for Congress
to take some further action, it is useful to begin with a brief introduction the
Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, including an
investigation of its purposes.
The Compact Clause prohibits states from entering into interstate
compacts without the consent of Congress."' The full text of Article I,
Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.7
The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution was modeled closely
after a similar clause in the Articles of Confederation, 73 and it is generally
accepted that the primary purpose of the clause at the time of its naissance
was to resolve border disputes between states.74 Since that time, however,
interstate compacts have come to cover a much broader subject range than
border disputes. 75 In addition to being used for managing interstate bodies
of water, compacts have been used for everything ranging from interstate
dairy agreements, to air pollution prevention,77 and managing ocean
thermal energy conservation facilities.78
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause-A Study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 691-95 (1925); JEROME C. MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER
COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT 242 (1971).
74. MUYS, supra note 73, at 242; Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Bridge Over Troubled Waters:
The Application of State Law to Compact Clause Entities, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 163, 169-70
(2005); see also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 73, at 692-95.
75. See generally Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue
of Permanence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 105 (2003) (discussing
three major interstate water allocation compacts in the West).
76. Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 7 U.S.C. § 7256 (1999) (consenting to a compact
and adding limitation on period of consent).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7402 (2008) (granting consent to states to negotiate and enter into compacts
for air pollution prevention, declaring compact non-binding without the approval of Congress).
78. Id. § 9115(c) (2008) (granting consent to states to negotiate and enter into compacts for
developing and managing ocean thermal energy conservation facilities, explicitly declaring such a
compact to be binding "without further approval by the Congress").
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Interstate compacts are particularly useful because they provide
benefits beyond what "ordinary state regulation" allows. 79 The primary
benefit is that interstate compacts that have the consent of Congress are
treated as federal law, and so preempt contrary state laws.8°
A. Purpose of the Consent Requirement
The purpose of the Compact Clause can be described grossly as falling
into two separate but interrelated categories: (1) protecting interests of non-
compacting states, and (2) protecting the supremacy of the federal
government.8'
1. Protecting Interests of Non-Compacting States, the Early Days of the
Compact Clause
The Supreme Court's initial interpretations of the Compact Clause
came in these boundary dispute cases.
In 1838, the Court heard a border dispute case between Massachusetts
and Rhode Island.82 In its decision the Court opined that,
[Interstate border disputes were within the scope of the Compact
Clause] not to prevent the States from settling their own boundaries,
so far as merely affecting their relations to each other, but to guard
against the derangement of their federal relations with the other
States of the Union and the federal government; which might be
injuriously affected if the contracting States might act upon their
boundaries at their pleasure.83
Two decades later, in another boundary dispute between states, the
Court declared that "[the Compact Clause] is obviously intended to guard
the rights and interests of other States, and to prevent any compact or
agreement between two States which might injuriously affect the interests
of others.84
Thus, in the early Compact Clause conflicts, the Court interpreted the
purpose of the clause as being a procedural barrier to harming, whether
purposefully or accidentally, the interests of non-compacting states. In
79. JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 842-43 (West, 4th ed. 2006).
80. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 66 (2003) (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,
438 (1981)).
81. See MUYS, supra note 73, at 242-51.
82. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
83. Id. at 726.
84. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1855).
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later cases, however, the Court focused less on protecting the interests of
states, and more on protecting the supremacy of the federal government.
2. Protecting the Supremacy of the Federal Government
In 1893, the Court reexamined the purpose and scope of compact
clause in Virginia v. Tennessee.85 In this boundary dispute case the Court
examined the underlying purposes the clause.86 Consistent with its prior
interpretations of the purpose of the Compact Clause, in Virginia v.
Tennessee, the Court described the role of the Compact Clause as being
"essentially protective in nature." 87 The Court quotes heavily from Justice
Story's Commentaries, reiterating that "the consent of Congress may be
properly required, in order to check any infringement of the rights of the
national government; and, at the same time, a total prohibition to enter into
any compact or agreement might be attended with permanent
inconvenience or public mischief."88 More recently, in Cuyler v. Adams,
the Court held that intent of the Compact Clause is to "ensure that Congress
... maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that
may otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal
authority."
89
III. Is the Consent of Congress Necessary for the
Compacting States of the GLC to Enter Into the Compact?
A. Scope of the Compact Clause
Although the plain language of the Compact Clause would lead one to
believe that the consent requirement applies to all agreements between
states, the Court has interpreted it otherwise.90  Rather the consent
requirement applies to "all forms of interstate agreement but not every kind
of subject matter."9'
Justice Field in Virginia v. Tennessee suggests, without definitively
holding, that the Compact Clause cannot be read literally, and so, not all
agreements made between states are subject to the consent requirement.
92
In that case he stated, "[ilt is evident that the prohibition is directed to the
85. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
86. MUYS, supra note 73, at 245.
87. ld. at 258.
88. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 520 (internal quotations omitted).
89. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981).
90. Note, State Collective Action, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1855 (2006).
91. MUYS, supra note 73, at 250.
92. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 503.
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formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in
the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States. 93  Although Justice Field did not provide an
exclusive list of exceptional areas, he did provide some examples:
(1) an agreement by one State to purchase land within its borders
owned by another State; (2) an agreement by one State to ship
merchandise over a canal owned by another; (3) an agreement to
drain a malarial district on the border between two States; and (4) an
agreement to combat an immediate threat, such as invasion or
epidemic.
94
In 1978, the Court again had occasion to uphold its interpretation of
the Compact Clause in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Commission.95  In that case, Justice Powell repeated Justice Field's
categories of agreements that "in no respect [could] concern the United
States.,96 And so, there are at least four subject areas of agreements that
are not subject to the Compact Clause.
B. GLC and the Compact Clause
The GLC, however, is of course subject to the requirements of
compact clause.97  It affects the rights and interests of other non-
compacting states, because the GLC would prevent out-of-basin
withdrawals. 98  For example, a neighboring Ogallala Aquifer state may
have been anticipating being able to use Great Lakes water for irrigation
and planned to use up their aquifer reserves accordingly. 99 Moreover even
if the GLC would not affect the rights of non-compacting states, it touches
93. Id. at 519. However, the Supreme Court did explicitly hold that the Compact Clause
cannot be read literally decades later, in New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976).




97. There is some support for the proposition that there may be compacts which are not
subject to the Compact Clause of the Constitution. See MUYS, supra note 73, at 251 (analyzing
Justice Field's opinion to indicate that "a formally executed compact dealing with a subject of
concern only to the compacting states and not touching an area of federal concern is probably
outside the coverage of the clause.").
98. Id.
99. This hypothetical is not as outlandish as it might seem at first. See MARC REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 10-11 (Penguin
Books 1986) (1993).
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two areas of federal concern: United States-Canadian relations; and
navigability of public waterways.
Although it is unlikely that the GLC would negatively impact the
relationship between the United States and Canada, in large part because
Ontario and Quebec were parties to Annex 2001 which laid the foundations
for the GLC, 00 implementing the GLC would affect relations between the
United States and Canada.'0 ' Because international relations are an area of
federal concern, the GLC is not exempt from the requirements of the
Compact Clause. Even if the GLC would not affect United States-
Canadian relations, it still touches another area of federal concern-
navigation of public waterways. 0 2 And, interstate agreements regarding
navigation of public waterways are subject to the requirements of the
Compact Clause.' °3 Therefore, it is highly doubtful that the GLC is an
agreement outside the scope of the Compact Clause.
C. Enforceability
If the Great Lakes states had assumed that the GLC was outside the
scope of the Compact Clause, and chose to not seek the consent of
Congress, they would create significant enforceability problems for its
implementation. Without the consent of Congress, an interstate agreement
is neither given the force nor stature of federal law.' 0 4 It would, therefore,
not be enforceable in federal court. Instead it would be treated the same
way that the Great Lakes Charter and Annex 2001 were treated-as
unenforceable handshake agreements.'0 5 As such, the GLC would have no
teeth, and would not be an effective tool to manage the Great Lakes
ecosystem. 106 Considering this, regardless of whether a case could be made
that the GLC is not subject to the requirements of the Compact Clause, it is
still wise for the signatories to obtain congressional consent.107
100. Annex 2001, supra note 45.
101. It is worthwhile to remember that it was the threat of a Canadian company withdrawing
water from the Great Lakes that drove Congress to pass the 2000 WRDA. See Charles F. Glass,
Jr., Note, Enforcing Great Lakes Water Export Restrictions Under the Water Resources
Development Act of 1986, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1508-09 (2003).
102. GLC, supra note 1.
103. See MUYS, supra note 73, 252; see also Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 171 (1894).
104. Cf Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,438 (1981).
105. Hall, supra note 9, at 445.
106. Dellapenna, supra note 69, at 796.
107. See id
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IV. Methods of Consent and the GLC
Congressional consent for interstate compacts may be implied and
consent can be granted before or after the compact is negotiated and
ratified.'0 8 Traditionally though, Congress has granted its explicit consent
to interstate compacts by passing legislation which says as much.10 9 In
addition to giving consent to a fully formed compact, Congress frequently
uses legislation to encourage states to enter into compacts. The most
prevalent form of this type of encouragement is seen in explicit consent to
negotiate. Generally the language of this type of legislation goes as
follows: "The consent of Congress is given to [specified states] to negotiate
and enter into agreements or compact, not in conflict with any law or treaty
of the United States [for specified purpose of the compact] ... ,,"10
Generally, though not always, Congress adds boilerplate language to such
legislation, which casts doubt on whether "consent to negotiate or enter
into compacts" satisfies the Compact Clause requirement. There are two
main categories of this type of boilerplate language. In the first, Congress
reserves its right to alter or amend the nascent compact."' The second
more clearly preserves Congress's role as the final authority on interstate
compacts by stating that any such compact is ineffective without further
review or approval by Congress.' 1 2 Yet, there is no case law on point that
clarifies whether or not explicit consent of Congress to negotiate and enter
into an interstate compact is sufficient to satisfy the Compact Clause
requirement.
A. Did Congress Explicitly Consent to the GLC, Prior to its Ratification?
1. Weeks Act and Explicit Consent
In 1911, Congress passed the Weeks Act, which, among its
many purposes, was meant in part to encourage conservation of fresh water
108. MuYs, supra note 73, at 255.
109. See Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 7 U.S.C. § 7256 (2008) ("Congress hereby
consents to the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact"); 16 U.S.C § 1204 (2008) ("Congress
consents to any compact [for the control of jellyfish]").
110. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1508(d) (2007).
111. MUYS, supra note 73, at 257. If Congress chooses to do this, it tends to use the
following terms: "The right to alter, amend, or repeal . . . is expressly reserved." 16 U.S.C.
§ 262(b) (1943).
112. Muys, supra note 73, at 259. For an example of a statute that grants consent to
negotiate see 16 U.S.C. § 17m (granting consent to States to negotiate and enter into compacts for
managing parks, declaring compact ineffective without approval of Congress); see, e.g., 33
U.S.C. § 567a (1940) (granting consent to specific states to negotiate and enter into compacts for
flood and pollution control, declaring compact non-binding without approval of Congress).
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sources. 113 It states that
[the c]onsent of the Congress of the United States is hereby given to
each of the several States of the Union to enter into any agreement or
compact, not in conflict with any law of the United States, with any
other State or States for the purpose of conserving ... the water
supply of the States entering into such agreement or compact."
4
The Weeks Act has all of the modem characteristics that demonstrate
the explicit consent of Congress to a compact." 5 It follows the linguistic
formula, using the words "[c]onsent of Congress . . . given to [particular
states] to enter into [a compact to do something specific]." ' 1 6 It appears to
grant congressional consent for an interstate compact to conserve water, so
long as it does not conflict with "any law of the United States.""' 7
The GLC is a compact between states to conserve water in the Great
Lakes Basin, which does not appear to conflict with any law of the United
states.1 8  So, it is possible that the Weeks Act of 1911 granted
congressional consent to the GLC of today; this, however, is unlikely.
More than thirty years ago, Jerome Muys argued that the Weeks Act is so
broad that it "would appear to constitute practical abandonment [by
Congress] of its constitutional responsibility to review all interstate
compacts in order to protect and promote the national interest."'9 And, to
date, the consent articulated in the Weeks Act has not been used to enforce
a subsequent interstate compact. Therefore, despite the Weeks Act's usage
of the "magic words of consent," it very likely does not constitute
congressional consent to the GLC for constitutional purposes.
2. The 2000 WRDA and Explicit Consent
Because the 2000 WRDA led to the creation of Annex 2001 and the
GLC, it is a natural place to begin looking for evidence of Congressional
113. Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.); see also MUYS, supra note 73, at 257. The Weeks Act also gave the
Secretary of Agriculture authority to acquire lands to protect water sources, produce timber and
exchange federal lands. See Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961.
114. Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
115. See, e.g., Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 7 U.S.C. § 7256 (2008).
116. Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
117. Id
118. See generally GLC, supra note 1; Hall, supra note 9.
119. MUYS, supra note 73, at 258.
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consent to the GLC."2 ° Instead of using boilerplate language to grant
consent, or consent to negotiate, the 2000 WRDA states
To encourage the Great Lakes States, in consultation with the
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, to develop and implement a
mechanism that provides a common conservation standard
embodying the principles of water conservation and resource
improvement for making decisions concerning the withdrawal and




"[A] mechanism that provides a common . . . standard" is a
description of an interstate agreement or compact. At minimum, Congress
is encouraging particular states to enter into such a compact. Yet the 2000
WRDA lacks all of the language of modern legislation that grants
consent-most notably the word "consent." 122 Rather the 2000 WRDA
looks similar to legislation wherein Congress grants consent to negotiate.1
23
The 2000 WRDA specifies the states that can participate, the subject matter
that Congress wants the states to deal with, and encourages the states to act
to achieve a particular goal.
124
But the specific wording of the 2000 WRDA sets it apart from other
legislation that simply encourages states to enter into a compact. The 2000
WRDA encourages states to go beyond forming a compact, and
"implement" the terms of the agreement.125 Moreover the 2000 WRDA
lacks any language that explicitly reserves the right of Congress to amend
the compact; nor does it include language that declares the compact to be
ineffective without further approval from Congress. 126  By the plain
language of the statute, Congress instructs, without mandating, the Great
Lakes states to enter into and begin implementing a compact to manage the
water resources of the area. Considering that no "magic words" are
necessary for Congress to express its consent to a compact, 127 this
declaration can be interpreted as congressional consent to a subsequent
120. Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. 16 U.S.C. § 17m (1936) (granting consent to States to negotiate and enter into compacts
for managing parks, declaring compact ineffective without approval of Congress).
124. Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. See Prochaska, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, 5 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 383, 389-90 (1986).
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compact between those states to manage Great Lakes water, so long as the
management is consistent with the 2000 WRDA provisions.
B. Implied Consent
The 2000 WRDA is, however, incongruent with legislation that
explicitly grants the consent of Congress to states to enter into interstate
compacts;12 8 and there is no analogous case where a court found explicit
Congressional consent to a compact where the word "consent" was not
employed in the language. As such, there is support for a conclusion that
Congress has not explicitly granted consent to the GLC. However, there is
support for a conclusion that Congress implicitly granted consent.
Although there is no clear test available to decipher when the consent
of Congress has been impliedly granted, in two nineteenth-century cases,
the Court gave some guidance on how to determine whether Congress has
implicitly consented to an interstate agreement.
In Virginia v. Tennessee, the Court held that "[consent of Congress for
an interstate compact] is always to be implied when Congress adopts the
particular act by sanctioning its objects and aiding in enforcing
them... ,129 In other words, if Congress (1) helps to enforce the
provisions of a compact, and (2) in some undefined way acts to legitimize
its goals, then Congress has implicitly granted its consent for the purposes
of Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. Green v. Biddle,
clarified this test, holding that "[w]hen determining whether Congress has
consented to the agreement, the relevant inquiry is has Congress, by some
positive act in relation to such agreement, signified the consent of that body
to its validity., 130 Like Virginia v. Tennessee, the signal for consent in this
test is whether Congress has taken an action that "sanctions" the interstate
agreement.
1. The 2000 WRDA and Implied Consent
There is significant evidence that Congress has acted to sanction the
GLC. As noted above, the 2000 WRDA encourages the states that were
involved in forming the GLC to form a compact.' 31 And the 2000 WRDA
uses particularly strong language-"encourage the Great Lakes States...
to develop and implement a [compact]"-which sanctions an agreement
128. Compare id., with Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 7 U.S.C. § 7256 (2008), and
Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16 U.S.C.).
129. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893).
130. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85-86 (1821) (internal quotations omitted).
131. Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000).
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among the Great Lakes states to manage the water of the region. 132 Also
significant is that the GLC effectuates the congressional purposes of the
2000 WRDA. The GLC is at its core "a mechanism that provides a
common conservation standard embodying the principles of water
conservation and resource improvement for making decisions concerning
the withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes Basin."' 133 This is
demonstrated in its common decision-making standard, which at a
minimum mandates that withdrawals and uses of water be consistent with
criteria based on principles of conservation and sustainability as described
by section 4.11 of the GLC.
134
2. The Weeks Act and Implied Consent
The Weeks Act provides supporting evidence to the 2000 WRDA that
Congress has acted to consent to the GLC prior to its formation. As noted
above, the Weeks Act appears to grant the consent of Congress for
interstate compacts that would conserve fresh water resources-like the
Great Lakes.' 35 This bolsters the argument that Congress has acted to
support the compact. 1
36
The question then becomes, is this enough evidence of implicit
congressional consent to make the GLC an enforceable agreement?
37
There is enough evidence between the 2000 WRDA and the Weeks Act for
a judge to hold that Congress has implicitly granted its consent to the
GLC.138 But such an outcome is uncertain at best.
3. Legislative History of 2000 WRDA
The 2000 WRDA is an unstable means to prove congressional consent
to the GLC. As discussed above, 2000 WRDA does not expressly grant
blanket consent to the GLC. 39 Moreover, the legislative history of 2000
WRDA weakens the argument that 2000 WRDA is evidence of implied
132. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
133. Id.; see also Hall, supra note 9, at 435-46.
134. GLC, supra note 1, § 4.11.
135. Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
136. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893).
137. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,438 (1981).
138. See Marlissa S. Briggett, Comment, States Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The
Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 751 at 761 (1991) ("[C]ompacts will be
sustained whenever possible.").
139. See supra Part lV.E.2.
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consent to the GLC.140 The sponsors of the 2000 WRDA, Senators Levin
and Baucus, stated in the Senate,
Mr. LEVIN. Would the chairman and ranking member also concur
that it is not the intent of this provision to pre-empt the need for
future appropriate congressional actions in this area?
Mr. BAUCUS. I would concur. This language should not be
interpreted as pre-empting the authority of Congress to approve or
disapprove an interstate compact, international agreement, or other
such mechanisms of implementation which properly fall under
congressional authority. It is simply the intent of the conferees to
encourage the States to promptly take such actions to implement
these standards as fall within their authority for management of the
water resources of their respective states and within the authority
vested in them by the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 for
making decisions regarding diversions of Great Lakes water. 141
Based on the above statements of Senators Levin and Baucus, one
could conclude that the 2000 WRDA is not constitutionally sufficient
anticipatory consent to the GLC.142 The obvious counter to this statement
is that remarks by two senators are not equivalent to congressional consent,
nor for that matter congressional denial. 
143
V. Conclusion
After more than a century of haphazard water management of the
Great Lakes, the GLC gives hope of providing a unified approach to
managing the Great Lakes and preventing out-of-basin withdrawals of
water.144 But, any implementation of the GLC is only as effective as it is
enforceable.1
45
140. Dellapenna, supra note 69, at 761.
141. 46 CONG. REc. S. 11405.
142. Dellapenna, supra note 30, at 863 Professor Dellapenna is the only scholar to have
commented on this aspect of the legislative history of 2000 WRDA in relation to the GLC. He
concludes, based on the comments of the two senators, that the 2000 WRDA is not anticipatory
consent to the GLC. Id.
143. For a short discussion of Justice Scalia's general disgust with the use of legislative
history, see Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 at 254-55 (1992); see generally Mark R.
Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative
History, 48 ARK. L. REV. 239 (1995).
144. See generally Hall, supra note 9.
145. See Dellapenna, supra note 69, at 761.
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The GLC is an interstate compact that is subject to the requirements of
Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, because it deals
with areas of federal concern. 146 In order for the GLC to be enforceable, it
must have the consent of Congress. 47 As long as the GLC has the consent
of Congress, it is treated as federal law.
148
Consent of Congress for interstate compacts can be implied or
express. 149  Although the 2000 WRDA encourages the formation of
something akin to the GLC, 150 it is a stretch to say that it is evidence of
Congress explicitly consenting to the GLC. That said, the 2000 WRDA
and the Weeks Act may have been sufficient evidence to suggest that
Congress has implicitly consented to the GLC, despite the views of
Senators Levin and Baucus. 15'
Yet, even if it were possible, or even probable, that Congress has
implicitly consented to the GLC-because it is essential for the GLC to be
enforceable in order to be effective-the Great Lakes states were wise not
to rely solely on that possibility if they wish to prevent out-of-Basin water
withdrawals and diversions.
The fear of that the citizens of the Great Lakes region that water from
the lakes will be taken from the Basin and used for the gain of others is not
an unreasonable one. 52 Massive diversions and withdrawals from the lakes
have been proposed before.' There have been proposals to use the water
of the Great Lakes to increase the navigability of the Mississippi River
154
and to recharge the Ogallala Aquifer.15 5  More recently, the Great Lakes
have faced a more insidious threat of water withdrawals, through
companies bottling water, and selling it out of the Basin. 156 And, proposals
146. GLC, supra note 1; see MUYS, supra note 73, at 252, 257.
147. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
148. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566
(1852); see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,442 (1981).
149. MUYS, supra note 73, at 255.
150. Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000).
151. 46 CONG. REc. S. 11405.
152. See Super Tuesday State Legislators Challenge Candidates to Restore Great Lakes,
Outlaw Water Diversions, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 31, 2008.
153. See Great Lakes: State Leaders Reach Agreement on Water Use, to Hold Final Vote,
GREENWIRE, Nov. 21, 2005, at Spotlight vol. 10 no. 9.
154. See Canada Sends US Note About Stance on Water Diversion, WALL ST. J., July 11,
1988, § 1 at 12.
155. See Saving the Great Lakes, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 16, 1985, at 8C.
156. See Assessing the Environmental Risks of the Water Bottling Industry's Extraction of
Groundwater: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Oversight &
Government Reform Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Noah D. Hall, Professor, Wayne
State University Law School).
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for massive water projects still come up the national political scene, as
when Governor Bill Richardson, while campaigning in the Southwest,
suggested to a Las Vegas, Nevada newspaper that perhaps the Great Lakes
region should provide water to desert regions where there is insufficient
water to support population expansion."'
Although there have been no major water projects recently, this fact
does not lead to an inevitable conclusion that no more will be developed or
proposed in the future. During times of water shortage, proposals for
massive water diversion tend to proliferate.1 58 And, as a consequence of
global climate change, water shortages in the United States will increase in
frequency and severity. 
159
Three decades ago, Jerome Muys argued that interstate compacts were
an essential tool for effective trans-boundary water management. 60  He
advised that, because the strength of an interstate compact was dependant
on its status as federal law, "Congress should enact legislation stating its
policy with respect to water compacts" so that the states can anticipate
whether or not they need to take further action to have consent., 6' As
demonstrated in this Note, what constitutes congressional consent for
constitutional purposes' 62 can be quite clear if Congress uses boiler plate
language, but there are other methods that Congress may use to consent to
a compact. These other methods may be promising alternatives to explicit
consent. But if the compacting states want certainty that a compact is
binding law, they would need to present the compact to Congress for its
explicit approval. 1
63
157. See Catherine McClure, At the Water's Edge: Great Lakes Compact Critical to
Protecting our Resources, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 20, 2008.
158. See generally REISNER, supra note 99.
159. RICHARD M. ADAMS & DANNELE E. PECK, DROUGHT AND CLIMATE-CHANGE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST (2002), available at http://www.economics.noaa.gov/
topics/climate.htm.
160. MUYS, supra note 73, at 323-24.
161. Id. at 371.
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
163. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,438 (1981).
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